Introduction
Globalization and financial openness were defining themes of the world economy in the last decade of the 20 th century, much as they were in the first decade. Indeed, from 1900 to 1913, international financial flows in relationship to the size of the world economy were larger than they are today.
In the wake of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, however, economists and policymakers have been questioning the value of the unhindered flow of international finance.
In particular, some have argued that such financial flows can destabilize domestic economies, as overseas investors rush into emerging markets and as quickly rush out, exacerbating both booms and downturns.
This article focuses on a crucial stage in Argentine financial development, the period from 1900 to 1935, as Argentina evolved from an economy highly dependent on external, primarily British, finance to one more nearly self-sufficient. This period permits a detailed case study of the consequences, for one country that was highly dependent on foreign finance, of the breakdown in the international financial system. Moreover, at least since Taylor's seminal paper (1992) , this has been an important area of research for Argentina, so that data and analyses are, while still incomplete, comparatively well developed. We thus are able to build on the work of Taylor (1992) , della Paolera and Taylor (1998 Taylor ( , 1999 , and Nakamura and Zarazaga (1998) , to examine the failure of domestic finance to adequately fill the void left by the decline of London and the breakdown of the gold standard world financial system in the interwar period. In addition, we extend the statistical series on the Buenos Aires Bolsa in Nakamura and Zarazaga with data from 1931 to 1935.
The story that we tell is one in which neither the Buenos Aires Bolsa nor the private domestic banks developed rapidly enough to fully replace the British investors as efficient channels for financing private investment. One consequence is that Argentine investable funds were increasingly concentrated in a single institution, the Banco de la Nacion Argentina (BNA), creating a lopsided financial structure that was vulnerable to rent seeking and to authoritarian capture. Despite this weakness, we should remain aware of the very impressive level of development that Argentina did achieve during this period. Several measures, including gold reserves, interest rates, money supply, bank credit, and the market capitalization of domestic corporations, attest to the vibrancy of Argentine financial development.
In his pathbreaking article, Taylor (1992) used the example of Argentine economic divergence from the mainstream to argue that Argentina's financial dependence on Great Britain in the early years of the century was a counterexample to the notion that foreign investment can jump-start prosperity. He showed that Argentine financial dependence and its demographic profile made it vulnerable to the decline of British financial leadership. Della Paolera and Taylor (1998, 1999) pointedly analyze the decline of private banking relative to the quasi-public Banco de la Nacion Argentina as a crucial element in the failure of Argentina's response to the challenge of British financial decline.
In the international arena, financial leadership after the Belle Epoque passed from
London to New York. This decline not only tended to raise world interest rates, favoring savers over borrowers, but it also deprived Argentina of the benefit of British knowledge of Argentine economic investment opportunities. Nakamura and Zarazaga (1998) and Taylor (2000) document the improved relative reception of large Argentine issues in the 1920s, so that Argentina was not, as an aggregate, deprived of access to international finance.
But in a period of creative destruction such as occurred in the early decades of the century, the ability of financial intermediaries to make fine-grained determinations about capital allocation can be crucial to the long-run success of economic enterprise. While the United States was willing to take over the British role of investing in the official bonds of Argentina and of Buenos Aires, and indeed did so at rates below those that would have been on offer in London, it did not step into a similar role for direct private investment.
A second theme in this paper is thus the development of domestic alternatives to international financial investors. The Buenos Aires Bolsa, domestic private banks, and the BNA were all channels for directing domestic savings into private investment. Of the three, as we shall see, only the BNA was able to rise in importance over the entire course of the period we investigate. As a quasi-public entity, the BNA was in a strong position to provide inside money to the Argentine economy, but it was probably not nearly as appropriate a provider of private investment finance.
Indeed, a recurrent question in economics has been the relative economic importance of the two sides of the banking ledger -loans on the asset side and deposits on the liability side. A long tradition of monetarism has focused on the importance of the stability of the growth of the money stock as a key determinant of the efficiency of economic regimes (for example, Friedman and Schwartz, 1963.) From this perspective, the liability side of the banking ledger is of key macroeconomic significance. On the other hand, at least since Bagehot (1920) and Schumpeter (1934) , economists have argued that the allocation of business finance has been a key contribution of the development of the banking system, thereby emphasizing the asset side of the banking ledger.
The policy relevance of this issue has risen rather than diminished over the years, as economic theory has come to play an ever more decisive role in debates over public policy. For example, if monetary and price stability are crucial prerequisites of development, and problems of credibility and intertemporal consistency of behavior are paramount, then the development of a regime such as adherence to a gold standard, a currency board, or dollarization may cut through knotty problems of institutional development. But if the efficient allocation of private finance is seen to be crucial to economic growth, then the development of legal and financial institutions that encourage the growth of private monitoring intermediaries like commercial banks and liquidity-enhancing markets like stock exchanges cannot be short-circuited.
In this paper, we seek to discuss Argentine financial development as seen through the lens of its stock market, by examining in some detail the monthly stock returns of the banking and nonbanking sectors of Argentina, as well as examining some basic banking balance-sheet data.
One motivation to following stock returns is that they are less subject to the serious measurement and methodological issues that arise on the reconstruction of the national accounts of the time and which seem to have blurred the debate with potentially conflicting stories.
1
Perhaps more important, a look at the relative valuation of stocks in different sectors of the economy may provide some useful insights into the microeconomic details of the 5 1 For instance, according to the internationally comparable figures compiled by Maddison (1995) , the hopes that Argentina would resume the fast 3 percent annual growth rate in per capita terms that the country had experienced in the period 1900-13 did materialize, since the equivalent growth rate for the period 1918-1829 was, on average, around 4 percent, even higher than before the Great War. By contrast, a recent revision of the national accounts of the time by Cortés Conde (1994) suggests that growth did slow down after 1914-18.
Argentinean development process that might escape the scrutiny of the usual macroeconomic aggregates.
Our data show, for example, that the domestic private banking sector of Argentina seems to have been struggling even before the Great War, while the industrial sector initiated a steady expansion right after it. We argue, in detail, that the banking crisis of 1912-14 played a large role in weakening the private banks in Argentina, and that this weakness contributed to the excessive development of the quasi-public Bank of the Nation. In turn, the lopsided development of Argentine finance made it vulnerable to the political economic chicanery described in della Paolera and Taylor (1999) .
Judging by the behavior of banks' stock prices and returns, the markets do not seem to have been particularly optimistic about the prospects of domestic banks after the Great War, perhaps an early warning of the massive bailout that would have to be engineered in 1935, under the auspices of the newly founded central bank, with characteristics that, in the view of della Paolera and Taylor (1999) , are reminiscent of the bailout implemented more recently in East Asia, after the 1997-98 crisis.
It is unclear, however, why financial resources in Argentina were not channeled through institutional mechanisms other than banks. Why did the stock market remain relatively small during a period of rapid economic expansion? Was the regulatory body regarding corporate finance or its legal framework important impediments to a more solid development of Argentinean domestic capital markets? Did the fact that the London Stock Exchange listed the most important Argentine issues inhibit the development of the Buenos Aires Bolsa? These are urgent questions whose answers remain relevant to today's economic and financial debates.
Section I. Analytical Framework
At least since Schumpeter, economic growth has been associated with financial development. One theoretical strand in the literature has placed the efficient working of delegated monitors at the center of our understanding of financial intermediation (Diamond, 1984, and Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) . In a more nuanced view of the role of banks, private banks are privileged as delegated monitors because their crucial role in the transactions mechanism gives them a heightened ability to monitor credits (Black, 1975 , Fama, 1985 . As such, public provision of deposit insurance that protects private banks from destabilizing runs may be preferable, despite the moral hazard problems it may engender, to narrow banks that are barred from making risky commercial advances. As Mester, et al. (2001) show, commercial banks do have access to information from checking accounts that is valuable in monitoring borrower activity.
This "credit" view of banking's role in development has been emphasized for Argentina by della Paolera and Taylor, 1998 , in which they point out that private banking was sharply curtailed during the crucial decade of the 1920s in the wake of the 1913-14 crisis. Below, we take a modest further step toward the important task of analyzing that crucial crisis. In particular, we point out that the Banco de la Nacion's quasi-official status may have aided it vis a vis private banks that lacked deposit protection. King and Levine (1993) identify bank credit (loans by banks and other deposit-taking institutions) and stock turnover rate as key financial variables that measure the ability of a financial system to abet the economic development of a country. Levine and Zervos (1998) 
Section II. The World Capital Market and Argentine Finance
During the Belle Epoque, Argentina successfully joined the world on the gold standard (Ford, 1962 , della Paolera, 1988 . Argentina provided for gold redemption and currency stability in the wake of the Baring crisis by setting up two institutions, the Currency Board (Caja de Conversion) and the Bank of the Nation (Banco de la Nacion Argentina). As described in della Paolera and Taylor, 1999 According to Baiocco (1937) On the other hand, it remained the case that international financial flows in the 1920s and 1930s were much smaller than they had been, as Taylor (2000) also documents. The question that arises is how well domestic financial markets were able to replace these financial flows.
The aggregate figures argue strongly that Argentine average saving rates were low in the first decades of the 20 th century. But domestic saving is calculated as a residual and thus is subject to considerable error. So while it appears likely that domestic savings were inadequate for Argentine economic development, there is value in examining to what extent quantitative characteristics of financial institutions in Argentina resemble those in countries with relatively well-developed ones. It is to this task that we now turn, first to the stock market, and then to the banking system.
Section III. Equity Trading on the Buenos Aires Bolsa, 1900-1935
This paper documents one step in a long-term project to construct a complete series of prices and dividends for all the firms that quoted on the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires stock exchange) in the 20th century. As of the current time, our data stretches from 1900 to 1935.
We document the fact that new listings and the overall capitalization of the Bolsa were relatively high, compared to gross domestic product, for an emerging market. However, the overall rate of transactions was rather low. In part, this may be due to the fact that the largest Argentine companies, the railroads, were listed on the London stock exchange rather than the Bolsa; these shares would naturally have had the highest rate of trading. A slow rate of turnover means that the stock market was less liquid and that the ability of the stock market to attract fresh capital to entrepreneurs was weakened. In addition, a low quantity of transactions means that brokerage commissions were also low, with the implication that the Bolsa was not an important source of income for equity brokers. As a result, news and analysis of Argentine equities would not have the monetary value that they would have had on a more active exchange.
On the other hand, by listing on the London stock exchange the railroads had access to large quantities of capital at low rates and were thus able to efficiently finance growth. As the development of the pampas and the port city of Buenos Aires as well as most industry in Argentina was the direct beneficiary of railroad development, the tradeoff was no doubt to the country's overall advantage, as Lewis has emphasized. Moreover, the active attention paid to Argentine affairs that the railroads inspired also aided other Argentine issues on the London market, like the custom loan. Thus while the fact that the most important Argentine securities traded there has implications for the development of the Buenos Aires Bolsa, it by no means suggests that Argentina would have been better off floating them domestically. 
Data
Certainly, the collection of the necessary data for this project has proved to be extremely time consuming, suggesting that investors at the time may have faced concerns regarding the transparency of corporate governance and the protection of shareholders' rights. This impression is reinforced by the Banco Español scandal uncovered in 1924 (discussed below), an indication of a potentially serious failure in supervision and regulation of the banking sector that contributes to the picture of East Asia-like features in the early stages of Argentina's development.
Several challenges had to be confronted in this task. The first and more serious one is the lack of a single reliable source of data on prices, volumes, and dividends, until the year 1921.
The data for the period 1900-21 had to be collected, therefore, from a variety of sources, as follows:
Period 1900-05:
The only source that summarizes monthly data on prices for this period is the Boletín Estadístico of the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, issued back then at about the 15 th of each month. Only a handful of companies were actively traded each month during this period.
Unfortunately, data on dividends and volumes for this period are not systematically reported by any source, and it was necessary to reconstruct that information piecemeal from the daily summaries of the newspaper La Prensa.
Even then, information on dividends is generally incomplete. For example, it's not rare to find La Prensa announcing the date of payment of a dividend without mentioning the amount.
That information had to be supplemented from other sources that occasionally reported annual dividends, such as the Anuario Pillado and its successor, the Argentine Yearbook. Combining these different sources, we are able to reconstruct all the dividends paid by the banks in our stock market index in that period, Banco Español del Río de la Plata and Nuevo Banco Italiano.
Period 1906-13:
For this period, the Review of the River Plate provided weekly summaries of the prices of most companies quoting in the stock market. We adopted the last price of the last week of each month as representative of the monthly prices.
This source also reports information on annual dividends, although the assigned date is that of the end of the fiscal year, rather than the actual date of payment and it misses most of the time the payment of provisional dividends. For all periods, the evolution of prices had to be monitored closely to filter spurious changes originated in cosmetic institutional features, such as stock splits or changes in shares'
denomination. In the indexes constructed for this volume, we have limited our indexes to the stocks with relatively continuous trading throughout the period. For these stocks we constructed quarterly price indexes, annual average dividend-price ratios and annual total investment returns.
All these indexes are constructed on the principle used in constructing the Dow Jones index, which is share-price weighting.
4 15 4 Our data on market capitalization are not complete for all the years we cover, so consistent market capitalization weights are not possible for this entire period. One natural alternative would be to average rates of return across all stocks, therefore giving each stock a weight of one in each period. However, a chained ratio of growth rates series introduces a systematic upward bias into the index. To give a simple example, suppose an index with only two stocks, a and b, valued in years zero and year two at 100 each. In year 1 stock a rises to 150 while stock b falls to 50. A share-weighted index would give a price of 100 in each year, while a chained growth rate series would show 100 in years zero and one, and 133 1/3 in year 2, because it would average a 100 percent increase with a 33 1/3 percent decline.
The Market Capitalization of the Bolsa
The Buenos Aires Bolsa had a market capitalization of roughly 900 million paper pesos (p.p.) in 1929, when the GDP was 9.7 billion p.p., so that the market capitalization was 9 percent of GDP. In that same year, the market capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange ( Two further points should be noted. First, the Argentine stock market did not list the major railway issues --the Southern, the Western, the Pacific, and the Central. Together, the Argentine railway issues had a market capitalization in 1929 of 92 million British pounds, 1.1 billion p.p. at the average exchange rate of that year. If we were to add these issues to the Argentine stock market, its capitalization would rise to above 20 percent of GDP. Second, we have included only ordinary stock, while the NYSE figures include preferred as well.
Demurgic-Kunt and Levine (1996) show that for 18 non-OECD countries with formal stock exchanges, using data from 1986-1993, the median ratio of market capitalization to GDP was 21 percent, which is similar to the capitalization of Argentina's equity issues, including the railway shares, in 1929. For OECD countries, the ratio was 24 percent. Thus the market value of publicly traded Argentine companies, including those listed on the London exchange, was quite high, even for a modern economy. This comparison shows that the market capitalization of the Argentine stock market was reasonably substantial for an emerging market. Although it did not represent Argentina's foremost industrial concerns, the railroads, it represented a high proportion of the remaining ones and a substantial amount of asset values.
Turnover on the Bolsa
Turnover --the extent to which outstanding shares are actively traded --varies considerably across stock markets and within stock markets over time. Thus the Argentine Bolsa's trading rate in the 1920s was relatively slow, either by contemporary standards or past ones, but by no means trivial. While the Bolsa cannot be considered highly liquid, it would be a mistake not to take seriously this market as a channel of finance. The railroads were the highest capitalization companies in the country and would likely have been traded very actively on the Bolsa had they been listed there. The fact that they were traded on the London stock exchange meant that the Buenos Aires Bolsa was deprived of trading income and stature, and this may have substantially reduced the likelihood that stock trading in general would thrive on the Bolsa. On the other hand, the greater liquidity and legal stature of the London stock exchange bolstered the railroads' ability to raise capital, and also raised the value of information about Argentina in London, and information spillovers no doubt helped other capital issues there as well.
New Issues on the Bolsa
Given the relatively high market capitalization of the companies on the Buenos Aires Bolsa, it should not be surprising that new listings on the exchange were substantial. The paid-in capital of these new listings is a good indication of the extent to which equity capital was being used to fund industrialization. The decline in new offerings after 1923 -no single year reaches 0.4 percent of GDP -is associated with the lack of forward momentum in the pace of transactions in the Bolsa. As shown in Table 2 , transactions on the Bolsa after 1923 are also about half of what they were before. Thus while causation no doubt runs both ways, the fact that the liquidity of shares on the Bolsa is not improving reduces the incentive of firms to list issues, and underscores the weakness of the Bolsa as an instrument for new funds.
In particular, despite the rise in the number of listings on the Bolsa, the ability of the rate of transactions to support new brokers and other sources of additional business information was not expanding. On the contrary, it appears that arbitrage opportunities may well have been declining, reducing the information flow from the stock exchange to the rest of the economy.
The importance of the downward trend in new offerings can be illustrated by the following calculation. Suppose new offerings had continued at a rate of 0.6 percent of GDP from 1921 to 1935. Then the size of the Bolsa (assuming the stocks held their value at par) would have been 300 million paper pesos larger, or roughly larger by 30 percent.
Rates of Return on Equity
Dividend-price ratio. One measure of the expected return to stocks is the dividend-price ratio. If price movements are difficult to forecast, as one expects on an equity market, movements in the dividend-price ratio may reflect changing ex ante returns to the market. In this 19 pesos.
respect, there do not appear to have been enormous changes in the ex ante returns on the Argentine Bolsa. Table 3 reports dividend-price ratios for a group of common stocks with nominal capitalizations in excess of 10 million paper pesos. Generally speaking, these represent the bulk of the Bolsa's market capitalization.
In the period from 1900 to 1905, dividend-price ratios were low, and stock prices rose rapidly. Thus it appears that in this period the exchange was dominated by stocks whose prices were expected to appreciate, and did so. This seems generally appropriate for an era that ex post was one of spectacular growth. For much of the rest of the period, dividend-price ratios are relatively higher around 6 percent, until the bear market of the 1930s, and dividends rather than Real rates of return. Prior to the 1930s, real rates of return on Argentina's Bolsa are generally quite strong. The periodization here has been chosen to match that in a careful study of international equity returns by Dimson et al. (2000) . Table 5 shows that for our Argentine stocks, real returns are above those in the US from 1900 to 1920, and then falter relatively in the 1920s. At least until 1929, then, stock market real returns do not appear to be the reason for the weak turnover and declining initial offerings.
In summary, where the New York Stock Exchange continues to strengthen and provide substantial finance as the 1920s develop, the Buenos Aires Bolsa falters as a source of capital during this period. Nevertheless, for much of the period under consideration, the Bolsa is a surprisingly strong source of capital funding and of good dividends.
Section IV. Banking Development and Banking Crises
Measuring Argentine banking development during the period 1900 to 1935 depends in large part on how one conceives of banking development. We shall show that Argentine banking development in the aggregate from 1900 to 1935 was quite substantial, but took place with a highly significant drawback -the steadily increasing importance of the BNA.
Bank loans. As shown in Table 6 and Figure However, as documented in della Paolera and Taylor (1998 Taylor ( , 1999 , the Argentine banking system during this period had an increasingly lopsided development, as the huge BNA grew much more rapidly than either private domestic or foreign banks. The relatively slow growth of private domestic banking during this period can in part be ascribed to the boom of 1910 to 1912 and the crash that succeeded it, as we shall show below.
In turn, the lopsided development of the Argentine banking system made the political capture of the financial system increasingly inviting, and the bailout of the Argentine private banks in 1935 documented in della Paolera and Taylor, 1999, was one of the outcomes.
Monetary development. Another measure of financial development is money. A measure that is often used for international comparisons is M3: currency in circulation plus deposits at all financial intermediaries. This measure has two virtues: one, it is available for more countries, and two, by broadly defining depositories, it makes minor institutional differences between countries less important.
During the period under consideration, 1901 to 1935, the ratio of M3 to GDP for Argentina was 45.0 percent (Table 6 and Figure 3 ). Over the same period, the ratio for the US 22 6 During this period, London clearing banks account for 77 percent of gross bank deposits in the UK.
was 55.5 percent and for the UK 58.5 percent. Thus on average, broad money in proportion to GDP was lower for Argentina than for the US, at a ratio of .82, and the UK, at a ratio of .77.
All three countries saw their ratios of M3 to GDP grow over the period, and broadly speaking, at about the same rate, at nearly a percent a year. In the decade from 1901 to 1910
Argentina had a M3/GDP ratio of 41 percent, while in the decade ending in 1935 it had a ratio of 49 percent. For the US, the comparable figures are 50.2 percent and 62.8 percent. And for the UK, they are 54.4 percent and 65.5 percent.
Argentine Private National Banks
The Argentine private banks (bancos privados nacionales) proved their mettle as early as the Baring crisis. In that crisis, when both the national bank and the provincial bank of Buenos Aires failed, a number of private banks weathered the storm. But almost all of them were forced to suspend, at least briefly, during that period. Alone among domestic private banks, 7 Banco
Espanol del Rio de la Plata had managed to keep its doors open throughout the crisis, relying on a high reserve-to-deposit ratio, greater than 50 percent. Although founded just four years before the Baring crisis, the Banco Espanol was soon able to replace Banco de Italia y Rio de la Plata as the top private bank as the result of the reputation it had won with its conservative investment strategy.
The period from 1900 to 1912 was a heady period for Argentine's financial community, as the economy flowered and deposits rose rapidly. Deposits and loans of the private banks grew faster than GDP, indeed, their ratios to GDP roughly doubled. And they grew relative to deposits and loans of the BNA. They may have grown too fast. Private banks used both security 23 issues and deposits to grow, and while they generally used conservative banking principles, reserves did shrink somewhat relative to deposits.
From 1900 to 1914, the Belle Epoque, Argentina had generally benefited from rising world prices, and Argentine export prices rose faster than import prices, so there was a favorable terms of trade effect. This boom time for Argentina was perhaps comparable to the boom in Southeast Asia in the 1990s. As we shall see, weakness within the Argentine financial structure appeared well before the London stock exchange holiday.
In London, the bank rate was raised in late 1912, and monetary pressure was not relaxed until early 1914. The 1912-13 crop in Argentina was excellent. Yet bank stocks and dividends appeared to be already under pressure.
In the first quarter of 1913, gold continued to be imported into Argentina at a phenomenal rate (35 million gold pesos), and in the second quarter (10 million), gold was still being imported at the rate of the previous year. But in the second half of the year, 42 million gold pesos were exported. Beginning in 1912, the disturbances of the domestic economy began to lead to widespread withdrawals of cash from the private banks, some of it in favor of the Bank of the Nation ,which was clearly perceived as a safe haven.
The closure of the London stock exchange on Friday, July 31, 1914, in retrospect put a definite period on the Belle Epoque, marking as it did the transfer of international financial leadership from London to New York. June 27, 1914, was the date of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo, the spark that set off the war. The outbreak of war during the following month was accompanied by a desperate flight to liquidity, as foreign investors sold securities at exchanges around the world. In particular, many investors were afraid that they would not be able to liquidate and repatriate overseas assets as the war widened. They thus dumped assets on markets and withdrew liquidity, causing prices to tumble. This in turn threatened many institutions, particularly financial ones, with failure. In addition, the warring nations themselves had a sudden pressing need to finance purchases of war materiel and the raising of armies. These rising pressures, over the course of July 1914, forced one exchange after another to close -most for extended periods. The world's major bond exchanges remained closed until the end of the year.
These liquidity needs naturally transmitted themselves to the Argentine markets, in particular, to the private banks. The most important private banks -Banco Espanol, Banco Italia, Banco Frances, and Nuevo Banco Italiano -were each identified with and dependent on immigrant communities that maintained strong ties with their homelands. As their depositors were naturally responsive to European calls for liquidity, these banks were subject to extraordinary demands on liquidity. As Table 7 shows, deposits at the five largest private banks fell by two-fifths. (Only Banco Popular, the smallest of the five, had a deposit loss less than 20 percent.) It is remarkable that these banks could survive such intense drains. However, it was not just a demand for liquidity that propelled the deposit losses. For, as della Paolera and Taylor, 1999, point out, the BNA actually gained deposits. On the one hand, then, a question arises as to whether the boom years from 1900 to 1912 had not themselves led the private banks to overextend. On the other hand, it could well be that some of the drain on deposits was due to contagious fears and a flight to safety that could have been stemmed by deposit insurance. Although the BNA, by rediscounting to the private banks, helped them weather the crisis, the BNA may also have, by representing a safe haven, encouraged flight.
One interpretation is that the banking crisis in this period was due to the end of London's role as financier to the world in general and Argentina in particular. An alternative interpretation argues that the extended boom from 1900 to 1912 had generated speculative conditions in Argentina that were in any case liable to cause the domestic financial structure to fall. This latter interpretation is close to that put forward in Ford's study of the crisis. We turn to detailed banking price data to shed additional light on this issue.
The Stock Market as a Window on Private Banks
Detailed analysis of stock price movements offers a window on the public's view of the business prospects of some of the major Argentine private banks. We review some of the evidence below that shows significant stock price declines at the banks before the deep liquidity squeeze that took place beginning in June 1914.
Nuevo Banco Italiano, the fourth largest private bank, had a stock price of 106 in "It is now public property that the Banco Español del Rio de la Plata has, at an extraordinary general meeting, held on February 2 nd , written down ts capital by 75 percentfrom $100 million Arg. paper to $25 million -and admitted losses which at the lowest reckoning total $103 million Arg. paper, and are generally believed to be in effect nearly thirty million more than this sum.
"… As far back as 1914 the bank, taking the view that to suspend the dividend would have led to closing down, decided to pay dividends out of 'funds other than profits,' i.e., presumably out of capital."
The capital loss of about 100 million paper pesos represented roughly one-third of the paid in capital of the private national banks as a group.
Thus it would appear that even before the end of the Belle Epoque, the boom of that period had resulted in excesses that had severely harmed the major private banks in the domestic banking system. The picture that emerges is one not dissimilar to events in Southeast Asia, where lack of financial controls during an economic boom inspired in large part by financial openness created banking sector weaknesses with dire economic consequences.
One consequence may have been that whereas the US was able to ship industrial and military supplies to Europe and take advantage of the war boom, a similar growth in the industrial sector in Argentina was difficult to finance. Moreover, it is not clear how soundly banks were operating. In its report on the revelations at the Banco Espanol, The Economist notes that, "in 1918, the bank indulged in the purchase of ships (trying by hook or by crook to obtain the necessary profits.) But the Armistice came along, and the only result of the shipping speculation was a further loss of $3 million m/n." The melancholy demise of the BNA in 1935 detailed in della Paolera and Taylor (1999) was due to bad loans arising predominantly in the private banking system. They calculate that one-third of all private banking loans had gone bad by then. By the end, with the Caja rediscounting to the BNA and the latter rediscounting on the collateral of bad loans, there was simply no control in Argentine's system of credit allocation.
Our analysis of bank stock prices suggests that the weakness in private banking arose in large part from the excesses of the Belle Epoque, antedating the severe international financial crisis touched off by the sudden start of World War I. Inadequate development of the institutions for providing private credit must have been an important limitation to the Argentina's economic development during this period. The creation of two durable institutions for maintaining the currency system was inadequate to the development of a sound financial regime.
Conclusion
The failure of most developing countries to attain high levels of per capita output during the 20th century is one of the most important questions for economics. One important cause of development failure is, no doubt, a failure of openness -countries that cut themselves off from world trade are unlikely to capture the benefits of technological progress abroad.
But an open financial regime is not a guarantee of domestic financial development, since the progress of domestic financial institutions is by no means automatic. The traumatic events in Argentina associated with the close of the Belle Epoque certainly warped its financial development. Despite a large stock market capitalization, good international credit, large gold reserves, a strong money supply, and apparently abundant bank credit, a careful study of the financial structure of Argentina reveals crucial weaknesses. , 1907 -1935 0.40% Average, 1919 -1935 0.28% 0.83% Average, 1907 -1923 GDP data: Table 6 Argentine Source: Stock market data, El Monitor de Sociedades Anonimas y Patentes de Invencion;GDP, Taylor (this volume) US Source: Stock market data: U.S. Historical Statistics GDP, Balke and Gordon, 1989, before 1929 , US NIA afterwards. Source: See text. Real returns deflated using wholesale price indexes from della Paolera, 1988, and Domenech, 1986 . Table 6 
